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PROGRAMME QUESTIONS: EVALUATION

Progress report on the in-depth evaluation of peace-keeping: start-up phase

Report of the Secretary-General

The present report reviews the status of prerequisites to learning from experience, such as end-of-mission assessments and the status of a ready capacity to act for substantive components of complex missions. An adequate ready capacity to act exists only for the electoral and repatriation components. A number of recommendations are made on such matters as responsibility centres, doctrine, and standard operating procedures for the information, electoral, human rights, civilian police and military components of peace-keeping missions. It is recommended that the final report, due in 1995, should cover overall direction and coordination, and the humanitarian component, as well as support functions, such as planning, financing, personnel, logistics, procurement and training.

* E/AC.51/1994/1.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Peace-keeping is not specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. While Chapter VI of the Charter deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VII describes a completely different concept for the use of military measures by the Security Council, namely, enforcement of the peace by various means, including as a last resort military action against a State which is threatening or breaching the peace. That provision has hardly ever been used. Instead, peace-keeping, which requires the consent of the parties to the conflict in question, has evolved as a pragmatic response to a variety of international conflicts which have been placed on the agenda of the General Assembly and the Security Council over the years. A broad international consensus has developed in recent years in support of peace-keeping as one of the most valuable techniques available to the United Nations for the control and resolution of conflicts.

2. Certain characteristics are common to all peace-keeping operations and can be summarized as follows:

(a) The operation must have the consent of the parties to the conflict in question;

(b) The Security Council normally adopts the resolution setting up the operation and decides on its mandate, usually on the basis of a recommendation by the Secretary-General. Thereafter, the Council's role remains crucial in providing political support to the Secretary-General as he carries out the mandate and in renewing or amending the mandate as necessary;

(c) The troops or military observers required for a peace-keeping operation are provided voluntarily by Member States, who are under no formal obligation in that respect. The willingness of Member States to provide troops is of crucial importance;

(d) The operation is under the command of the Secretary-General, who is responsible to the Security Council for all aspects of the operation. Military personnel contributed by the Governments of Member States are under the command of the Secretary-General in operational matters, though they remain under national command in matters of pay and discipline. It is a basic principle of peace-keeping that the military personnel in a peace-keeping operation do not accept orders from their national authorities in respect of operational matters, but only from their United Nations commander, who receives his orders from the Secretary-General. Failure to respect this chain of command can lead to serious operational and political difficulties;

(e) The operation maintains an attitude of complete impartiality between the parties to the conflict;

(f) In the case of peace-keeping forces which are armed, force is used to the minimum extent possible and normally only in self-defence;

(g) The costs of a peace-keeping operation are normally considered to be the collective responsibility of the States Members of the United Nations. Each

Member State is required to pay its share, which is assessed on the basis of its ability to pay.

3. Until 1989 and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, peace-keeping operations had been largely military in task and composition. Recent peace-keeping operations, however, have been multifaceted in nature with substantial civilian elements making their contribution through the components identified in section B of chapter II below.

4. The Committee for Programme and Coordination, at its thirty-third session, considered the note by the Secretariat on topics for future in-depth evaluations (E/AC.51/1993/6). The Committee recommended to the General Assembly, inter alia, that "Peace-keeping operations: start-up phase" be subject to in-depth evaluation, and that the final report be presented to the Committee in 1995. 1/ Established practice requires a progress report containing findings and recommendations based on existing information to be submitted to CPC prior to the submission of the final report.

5. Peace-keeping operations are now large, frequent and complex enough to require the United Nations to develop and maintain a general state of preparedness. The present progress report therefore focuses on prerequisites to the efficient start-up of peace-keeping operations. The issues examined are related to the capacity of the Organization to learn from experience, the status of a ready capacity to act for six of the main substantive components of complex missions, and the possibility of some start-up preparation during pre-mission negotiations. The present report is the first part of a comprehensive study of the start-up phase of peace-keeping operations; factors beyond the control of the Secretariat, but affecting the Organization's ready capacity to act, such as the absence of a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment and lack of resources in the Working Capital Fund, will be among those dealt with in the final report on the study, which is to be completed in early 1995. There are several other elements of peace-keeping operations which have a direct bearing on the start-up phase, for example, logistical planning, budgeting, technical/needs assessment missions, conclusion of status of mission agreements, identification of experienced staff members for key positions in peace-keeping operations and general problems of staffing. Those elements along with questions of overall direction, interrelationships among peace-keeping components, and the interface of humanitarian and peace-keeping operations, will also be dealt with in the second part of this in-depth evaluation. Proposals for the final study are presented in chapter II below.

6. The present progress report is based on published United Nations documentation, including reports of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations and reports on the Agenda for Peace, relevant internal documents, and structured interviews with staff members involved in various aspects of peace-keeping operations.

7. In a few cases the recommendations have programme budget implications. This is in conformity with the expectations of the General Assembly, which, in paragraph 6 of resolution 48/42 stressed "the need for the United Nations to be given the resources commensurate with its growing responsibilities in the area of peace-keeping, particularly with regard to the resources needed for the start-up phase of such operations".

I. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Prerequisites of learning from experience

1. End-of-mission assessments

8. At the completion of missions, the Secretary-General submits concluding reports on substantive questions to the Security Council or the General Assembly, depending upon the nature of the missions, and performance reports on administrative and budgetary questions to the General Assembly. Technical end-of-mission assessments by the Chief of Mission, however, are undertaken in an ad hoc manner; there is no formal policy on the preparation of such assessments. In the case of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, a 328-page draft end-of-mission assessment was prepared, but owing to more urgent demands on staff dealing with peace-keeping, could not be edited and issued in a form suitable for circulation. Many people who could make use of the descriptive material in that draft are unaware of its existence. An assessment report on UNTAG was requested by the General Assembly in paragraph 14 of resolution 45/75, but not issued owing to more urgent demands on staff dealing with peace-keeping operations. A full treatment of the UNTAG operation is given in chapter XVII of The Blue Helmets. 2/ In the case of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), an end-of-mission assessment is in preparation.

Recommendation 1. End-of-mission assessments

(a) The Department for Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) should adopt a policy governing internal end-of-mission assessments by the Chief of Mission. The policy should:

(i) Specify the maximum time after the completion of the mission by which the report is due;

(ii) Require that the report include the following elements: (a) factual descriptions of the manner in which the main components were carried out, drafted by the heads of those components; (b) a frank analysis of the factors that affected the outcome of the mission, and lessons of a general nature for future peace-keeping missions, including those drawn from Headquarters Boards of Inquiry;

(iii) Provide for dissenting opinions by senior officers of the mission.

(b) Assessments of each completed mission should be invited from Member States, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations that had participated in the mission.

(c) An assessment report of the Secretary-General should be issued within a year of the termination of each mission, and should contain an analysis of the factors affecting the outcome of the mission and general lessons drawn, including those derived from the invited comments.

(d) A policy analysis and evaluation function should be established within DPKO to act as a "think tank", to assist the Under-Secretary-General in the formulation of policies and procedures, to analyse and assess operations and evaluate the results achieved and lessons learned therefrom.

Recommendation 2. End-of-mission assessment of UNTAG

The draft end-of-mission assessment of UNTAG, including its annexes, with an indication of authorship and a disclaimer on its cover page stating that the views expressed in it are those of the authors and not necessarily official positions of the United Nations, should be placed in the DPKO documentation centre. The descriptive chapters on each component should be made available to those in DPKO and other departments responsible for the development of those components.

2. Exit interviews, debriefings and mid-mission assessments

9. There is no formal policy on exit interviews, debriefings or mid-mission assessments or assessments at the end of each phase of a mission. Practice has varied from one mission to another.

Recommendation 3. Exit interviews, debriefings and mid-mission assessments

DPKO should adopt a policy requiring (a) exit interviews and debriefings for all senior staff leaving peace-keeping missions; (b) a formal assessment at the end of each phase of a mission, prior to the commencement of the succeeding phase, based on a field visit by senior staff from Headquarters, including, wherever possible, at least one person familiar with the negotiation process that led to the establishment of the mission.

3. Peace-keeping documentation centre

10. The procedure for the establishment and maintenance of reference centres was defined in March 1976. 3/ There is no adequate central documentation centre in DPKO. Assistance given by DPKO to senior staff of new missions is not systematic; the lessons of experience are currently transmitted informally by individuals and not by institutional procedures.

Recommendation 4. Peace-keeping documentation centre

DPKO, in consultation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, should establish a central documentation centre containing sets of internal documentation on each peace-keeping mission, including the manuals, policies and rules of procedures developed in the mission; copies of all declassified reports of Headquarters Boards of Inquiry relating to it; and internal and external assessments and evaluations, and other relevant material from Member States, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. Oral histories and audio-visual materials related to missions should also be part of the

holdings of the documentation centre, the staff of which should, as one of their main functions, assist those responsible for establishing policies and procedures governing a new mission.

4. Archives and oral histories

11. United Nations policy on archives was set out in 1984 in an Administrative Instruction. 4/ Rules with regard to archives and records management, utilization, preservation and disposition of United Nations records, and prescribing custodial responsibility, were provided in June 1991 in the Secretary-General's bulletin 5/ and in the draft Field Administration Manual. Records of archival value are to be transferred to the United Nations Archives, while records of short-term value are to be destroyed in situ, upon authorization by the Chief, Archives and Records Management Section at Headquarters. The draft Field Administration Manual provides, in section V.1.3, that the transfer of records to Archives and destruction of records in situ "normally takes place at the close of a mission". The status of records for recently completed missions was as follows as of 31 December 1993:

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
April 1988-March 1990; no records received;

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (Namibia) (UNTAG)
April 1989-March 1990; set of 673 boxes of records available;

United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)
January 1989-June 1991; no records received;

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
December 1989-January 1992; only file list available;

United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
August 1989-February 1991; only file list available;

United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
November 1991-March 1992; no records received;

United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
April 1992-March 1993; no records received;

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
March 1992-November 1993, with an additional phase to April 1994; no records received.

12. Documentation of peace-keeping missions tends to be voluminous, due in some measure to extensive duplication of materials among offices at the Mission and at Headquarters, but often lacks valuable records of decision-making, actions and contributions of the mission. In general, problems of documentation can be traced to a need for changes in the systems and procedures for creating and managing records. Registry systems for central filing of mission records do not match the current style of management of missions. It is more appropriate to give responsibility for the records associated with functions such as

procurement, personnel administration or public information to staff members carrying out that function. In many missions, the registry files are incomplete since officials maintain their own functional office files and do not send copies of all materials to the registry. The registry files are largely duplicates of other files and are rarely consulted.

13. Policy regarding the external use of peace-keeping records states that:

> "Members of the public may have access to (i) archives and records that were accessible at the time of their creation, (ii) those which are more than 20 years old and not subject to restrictions imposed by the Secretary-General, and (iii) those which are less than 20 years old and not subject to restrictions imposed by the Secretary-General, on condition that the originating office has given written consent for access. [Furthermore,] records as to which the Secretary-General or his authorized representatives have imposed restrictions may be declassified at any time by the same authority." 6/

Between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1993, 35 external users (academicians, historians, writers and journalists) had reviewed archival records relating to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

14. As of the end of 1993, the Dag Hammarskjöld Library had holdings of 116 oral history interviews, 14 of which were on the Congo operation and 1 on UNEF. There were no interviews on other missions.

Recommendation 5. Archives and oral histories

(a) All mission records determined to be of archival value under existing procedures should be transferred to United Nations Archives within 12 months of completion of the mission. The chief of each mission should designate an official responsible for that transfer.

(b) The registry system of maintaining mission records should be replaced by a records management plan establishing what records should be created and maintained for each function of mission management, and giving instructions for filing and indexing, and procedures for disposition at the close of mission. The mission records management plan should be developed in consultation with the Archives and Records Management Section and be issued by the chief administrative official of the mission. Training in records management should be included as part of the mission training. Training for mission assignments should include the importance of documenting action and maintaining adequate records for future utilization by the United Nations and by researchers. Briefings for senior officials should include the concepts of inviolability of United Nations records and ownership of all records by the United Nations. Briefings for functional managers should include procedures for setting up and maintaining required documentation and for disposition of records at the close of mission.

(c) Oral history interviews on missions should be conducted by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library within 12 months of the completion of the

mission. Interviews on UNTAG and UNTAC should be given priority and conducted as soon as possible.

(d) It should be the policy of the United Nations to encourage actively scholarly research on United Nations peace-keeping operations and the establishment of academic centres of research on peace-keeping. Responsibility for implementing this recommendation should be assigned to the United Nations Archives in cooperation with the Dag Hammarskjöld Library and in consultation with DPKO.

B. Status of ready capacity to act for substantive components of complex missions

1. Overview

15. The status of a ready capacity to act for each of the main substantive components of complex missions is examined in this chapter. Four sets of questions were asked concerning the existence of a responsibility centre, underlying doctrine, standard operating procedures and operationality. Those questions are reproduced in annex I below.

16. Table 1 gives an overview of the findings set out in the present chapter. An adequate ready capacity to act exists only for the repatriation and electoral components of peace-keeping missions. Issues concerning overall direction and coordination and the humanitarian component need to be examined in the follow-up to the present progress report, as proposed in paragraph 84 below.

Table 1. Status of ready capacity to act for major substantive components of peace-keeping missions

Major component	Does adequate responsibility centre exist?	Do doctrines (that is, internationally agreed principles of action) exist?	Do standard operating procedures exist?	Is operationality adequate?
Information	No	No	No	No
Electoral	Yes	Yes	In draft	Adequate
Repatriation	Yes	Yes	Yes	Adequate
Human rights	No	Some	No	No
Civilian police	No	Some	In draft	No
Military	Yes	Some	Yes	No; stand-by arrangements initiated in 1993

2. Information component

17. The Secretary-General, in his report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session on the work of the organization, stated that: 7/

> "In the atmosphere of heightened tension in conflict areas, public information activities play a vital role in facilitating the mission's work by disseminating timely and objective information, and counteracting propaganda and misinformation. Effective public information activities can also be instrumental in generating and sustaining the support of the international community for the success of the missions."

Information activities during the mission period should take into account the following key elements:

(a) The need to mobilize public opinion in the countries hosting peace-keeping operations, as well as countries contributing to them;

(b) The existing communications infrastructure in the mission area, as well as cultural, political and economic variables that would have an impact on information activities;

(c) The extent, contents and trend of coverage of the specific mission and the way the United Nations operation is reflected by the international media.

18. Experience. There were three phases to the UNTAG information strategy:

(a) From 1 April to mid-July 1989. Explaining the various tasks of UNTAG, allaying fears and misapprehensions and conveying a positive image of its personnel;

(b) From mid-July to early November 1989. Explaining election-related processes: how to register, how to vote, the importance of voting and the individuality of electoral choice. In parallel with this, UNTAG began from mid-September to publicize a "code of conduct" for those involved in the election;

(c) From November 1989 to March 1990. The underlying theme to UNTAG interviews, radio and television broadcasts was preparation for independence.

The Information/Education Division of UNTAC established its own radio station, which provided information to the Cambodians on the mandate of UNTAC, clarifications on voter registration and electoral processes and on procedures utilized by UNTAC to ensure the observance of basic human rights. The Information/Education Division also produced, and distributed widely, information about the role of UNTAC military, police and civilian personnel.

19. Responsibility centre. There are three sets of functions: (a) spokesperson of the peace-keeping mission, (b) the information component of the mission itself in the field, and (c) information on peace-keeping operations disseminated from Headquarters. Functions (a) and (b) are under the responsibility of the Chief of Mission, who selects his senior personnel for this component in consultation with DPKO and DPI. Responsibility for the development of doctrine, standard operating procedures and operationality for these functions is not currently assigned. Each mission has operated with ad hoc central support, partly provided by DPKO and partly by DPI. The third set of functions is undertaken by the Peace and Security Section of DPI.

20. The General Assembly, in paragraphs 55 and 56 of resolution 48/42, made two requests pertinent to the issues raised here:

> "55. Recognizes that public information on peace-keeping operations, particularly an understanding of their mandates, is important and calls for significant enhancement of the press and public information function for peace-keeping missions and in particular for rapid deployment at the start of a peace-keeping operation of a robust and professional media outreach programme in the area of operation commensurate with the scope and needs of the missions;
>
> "56. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with Member States, to establish guidelines for the public information function of peace-keeping operations."

21. The functions of the Peace and Security Section relating to peace-keeping operations have been described as follows: 8/

> "Develops information materials and programmes related to peace and security;

"Develops information materials for peace-keeping activities, and liaises with and provides information support to information components of peace-keeping and other political missions in consultation with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations and relevant units within the Department of Political Affairs;

"Undertakes outreach efforts to the news media and other constituencies in the field of peace and security."

The Peace and Security Section consists of three Professionals and two General Service staff members and is fully occupied with the functions it is currently undertaking. The Section has provided some support to the information components of peace-keeping missions, but its capacity in that respect is very limited. Its main focus is to produce materials on peace-keeping operations and peacemaking efforts for distribution at Headquarters. 9/ It should be noted, however, that planning and implementation of the information programme for a particular peace-keeping mission is carried out not only by the Peace and Security Section in DPI, but involves the Department as a whole.

22. DPKO does not have a specialized unit responsible for the functions listed in annex II below, as applied to the information and education component of missions. The Mass Information Unit of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), created in 1993, in addition to its Public Information Unit in the light of the UNTAC experience, would be the closest analogue in the United Nations. The staff of an analogous DPKO Unit, while selected for expertise in information, would be primarily concerned with assisting missions in the field. Such a Unit needs to be supervised by and in daily working relationship with those responsible for peace-keeping operations. The Peace and Security Section in DPI does not have the capacity to assess field needs and develop standard operating procedures for missions.

23. Doctrine. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are, broadly speaking, pertinent, there is as yet no doctrine that has been developed specifically relating to the peace-keeping information component.

24. Standard operating procedures. There are as yet no standard operating procedures for the field aspects of the information component. A note by the Secretary-General to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) in February 1993 describes standard elements for the information component of peace-keeping and other political missions.

25. Operationality. The process of selecting spokespersons has varied, as has their background and experience. There is no roster of staff members who could potentially perform as spokespersons and no specific training geared to building up such a ready capacity. The post of spokesperson is, however, critical and should be filled as soon as possible after the appointment of the Chief of Mission.

Recommendation 6. Responsibility centre for the information component

A unit should be established in DPKO with responsibility for the development of doctrine, standard operating procedures, operationality and

related matters, as listed in annex II below, for the information component of peace-keeping operations. The unit should closely coordinate its work with DPI and the information units in UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF and the specialized agencies.

Recommendation 7. Doctrine on the information component

DPKO, in consultation with DPI, should develop guidelines for the information component of peace-keeping missions by a process similar to that described in paragraphs 30 and 31 below for the electoral component. The views of Member States on approaches to the information component should be sought and guidelines drafted on the basis of those views and assessments of experience in missions.

Recommendation 8. Mission-related media outreach

The spokesperson of a mission, supported by the DPKO Unit responsible for the information component and DPI, should mount a media outreach programme from both Headquarters and the field at the commencement of each mission, commensurate with its scope and needs.

Recommendation 9. Roster of potential spokespersons for missions

DPI, in consultation with the spokesperson's office and the DPKO information unit, should develop a roster of United Nations staff trained and ready to assume the responsibilities of spokesperson for a peace-keeping mission. That training should include procedures for the media outreach programme referred to in recommendation 8.

Recommendation 10. Standard operating procedures for the information component

The Note by the Secretary-General to ACABQ on standard elements for the information component should be revised by the DPKO Unit responsible for information, in consultation with the Peace and Security Section of DPI, to incorporate the experience gained in UNTAC and other missions. The revised Note should be drafted as a set of standard operating procedures for the information component of peace-keeping operations. It should be circulated in draft for comments and suggestions to all organizations and individuals with policy-level experience in the information components of recent missions.

3. Electoral component

26. Experience. Since 1989, the United Nations has provided several forms of electoral assistance in the context of peace-keeping missions. The most extensive type of assistance, the organization and conduct of elections, was successfully carried out in the case of the 1993 elections in Cambodia; a similar process is now under way in Western Sahara. In 1989, the United Nations supervised elections which resulted in Namibia's independence. The United Nations has verified elections in Angola, Eritrea, Haiti and Nicaragua and is currently preparing for the verification of the electoral process in

El Salvador, Liberia, Mozambique and South Africa. Of those 11 electoral operations, 7 have included military and/or police components (Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique and Western Sahara); the remaining four were essentially civilian operations. In each case to date, the mandating organ (the General Assembly and/or the Security Council) has endorsed the final statement issued by each electoral mission concerning the freedom and fairness of the elections.

27. Responsibility centre. The Electoral Assistance Unit (EAU) was established in 1992, in the Department of Political Affairs and provides direct support to the United Nations focal point for electoral assistance activities. The draft description of the functions of the Unit 10/ adequately covers the functional responsibilities listed in annex II to the present report. The Unit has a small professional staff financed by the regular budget of the United Nations. The relationship of EAU to the electoral component of peace-keeping missions "has improved considerably over the last year. ... For all of the missions, the Unit will maintain close contact with their electoral components and support them as necessary". 11/

28. Working in consultation/coordination with the Electoral Assistance Unit, electoral assistance activities are also conducted by UNDP, the Centre on Human Rights, the Department of Development Support and Management, and the United Nations Volunteer Programme. A review of United Nations electoral assistance activities for 1992-1993 was carried out at the initiative of the UNDP Electoral Group. 12/

29. Doctrine. At the level of broad principles, the General Assembly underscored "the significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which establish that the authority to govern shall be based on the will of the people, as expressed in periodic and genuine elections". 13/

30. At the level of operational principles, the Secretary-General, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 45/150, invited Member States to submit their views concerning suitable approaches that would permit the Organization to respond to requests from Member States for electoral assistance. In a report of the Secretary-General on enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections, submitted to the Assembly at its forty-sixth session, four criteria were suggested which should be satisfied if an eventual mission were to be considered. 14/ The General Assembly, in resolution 46/137 of 17 December 1991, took note of those criteria "which ought to be met before the Organization agrees to requests for electoral verification". At the forty-seventh session, the Secretary-General proposed that, in view of recent experience, the criteria might be defined as follows: 15/

> "(a) Requests should pertain primarily to situations with a clear international dimension and which may relate to the maintenance of international peace and security;
>
> "(b) Monitoring provided by potential United Nations activity should cover - geographically and chronologically - the entire electoral process, from the initial stages of registration through the elections themselves;

"(c) There should be a specific request from the Government concerned as well as broad public and political support for a United Nations role;

"(d) Approval should be provided by the competent United Nations organ."

31. The Secretary-General also proposed guidelines on the organization and conduct of an electoral process, supervision of an electoral process, verification of an electoral process, following an electoral process, and provision of support to other international observers, as well on the status of the mission agreement and the staffing of missions. 16/ The General Assembly, in paragraph 9 of resolution 47/138, recommended that the proposed guidelines on electoral assistance be considered as provisional, and requested the Secretary-General to evaluate them in the light of experience over the next two years. An evaluation of the guidelines was submitted to the Assembly at its forty-eighth session 17/ and, in resolution 48/131 of 18 December 1992, the Assembly recommended that the Secretary-General provide a revised set of guidelines for consideration at its forty-ninth session.

32. Standard operating procedures. The EAU is developing detailed standard operating procedures, bearing in mind that each context has its own specificities. A description of the Unit's operating procedures includes a taxonomy of electoral missions, basic approaches for United Nations supervision and verification missions, and an analysis of the determinants of the size of missions. Standard approaches are being developed concerning the basic fairness of the electoral system, arrangements for observation, electoral administration, verification of the electoral campaign, and related issues.

33. Operationality. EAU has developed and maintains a roster of international electoral experts for both the staffing of the electoral components of peace-keeping operations and the provision of United Nations electoral assistance generally. It has also invited Member States to identify candidates who might be seconded as members of United Nations electoral verification missions. The roster of EAU is complemented by the roster of DPKO for personnel called upon to perform generalist electoral functions. In addition, EAU has standing arrangements with the United Nations Volunteer Programme (UNV). The Director of EAU considers that UNV personnel meet competency requirements and that the UNV Programme (UNDP) is a viable low-cost source of general electoral expertise. It is also able to recruit rapidly well-qualified personnel to assist in specialized roles as advisers on electoral and constitutional law, parliamentary processes, civic education and election preparation and management. For positions at the general service level, EAU has made use of UNDP rosters kept by offices in the field to hire locally recruited and competent personnel at a lower cost than international General Service staff.

34. Responsibility for pre-mission training rests with the Training Service of the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM). While EAU itself conducts specialized briefings and training in the field, it has encountered logistical difficulties in the process and has produced a training kit in partial answer to that difficulty.

35. The Secretary-General has established a voluntary trust fund for cases in which the requesting Member State is unable to finance, in whole or in part, the

electoral verification mission. The Administrator of UNDP has established a separate Trust Fund for Technical Assistance to Electoral Processes.

36. A global Electoral Assistance Information Network was established after the United Nations Conference on Coordination of International Assistance in the Electoral Field, held at Ottawa from 5 to 8 October 1992. 18/ The purpose of the Network is to share information among donor countries, international and multilateral organizations, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations engaged in electoral assistance. The EAU prepares periodic bulletins for the Network on the activities of its members.

Recommendation 11. Electoral Assistance

The Electoral Assistance Unit should be designated the responsibility centre for the electoral component of peace-keeping missions. It should maintain institutional memory and develop doctrine, standard operating procedures and operationality in this area, and have primary responsibility for substantive guidance and support of the electoral component of future peace-keeping missions.

4. Repatriation

37. Experience. In Central America, the humanitarian activity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) preceded the Esquipulas II Agreement, signed on 7 August 1987 at Guatemala City by the five Central American Presidents, 19/ as well as any peace-keeping deployment. UNHCR and UNDP have played a key role in the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) process, undertaken in 1989 in support of the Central American peace process. 20/ Peace-keeping missions were deployed in support of the Central American peace process: ONUCA in 1989, covering the five Central American countries; and ONUSAL in El Salvador in 1993. Those peace-keeping operations supplemented and supported the CIREFCA process, in the overall framework of the Esquipulas II Agreement.

38. In UNTAG, the role of UNHCR in the repatriation operation was secured mainly by the Task Force/Core Action Group set up by UNHCR to cover the operation, which involved UNHCR headquarters and field units, and sectoral inputs by United Nations specialized agencies. Although UNHCR was considered part of the UNTAG civilian operation, UNHCR had administrative autonomy, which proved to be expedient in particular in the area of equipment.

39. The UNTAC repatriation operation was evaluated by UNHCR in 1993 and the review emphasized the following:

(a) Detailed planning was initiated well in advance of the repatriation movement, enabling UNHCR to raise funds and to build a strong operational capacity. However, the plans incorporated a number of faulty assumptions regarding the refugee population and realities of the areas of return, which necessitated a significant shift in the repatriation strategy of UNHCR.

(b) The operational environment was favourable: the refugees themselves were eager to repatriate, and the operational partners of UNHCR were effective.

High-quality staff were deployed by UNHCR, and decision-making responsibilities were effectively delegated to the field. The working relationship with UNDP-OPS for returnee relief and reintegration represents an important development. The high priority placed on external relations assisted the organization to gain acceptance for some of the more contentious elements of the programme.

(c) Once the Transitional Authority was established, UNHCR was invited to assume the role of Repatriation Component. As far as the Rehabilitation Component was concerned, however, a decision was taken not to make similar use of UNDP; instead, an entirely new structure was created. Unfortunately, lacking funds, staff, stable leadership and a field presence, the Rehabilitation Component was not able to play a very substantial role in the transitional period.

40. Doctrine. The task of promoting and facilitating durable solutions to refugee problems is embodied in the Statute of UNHCR. 21/ Article 1 defines durable solutions under two distinct headings: voluntary repatriation and assimilation. Under voluntary repatriation there are three principles: 22/

(a) No refugee should be returned to his or her country of origin or habitual residence against his or her will;

(b) There must be clear and unequivocal agreement between the country of asylum and the country of origin, both on the modalities of the movement and the conditions of reception. Wherever possible, tripartite commissions should be formed involving the countries of origin and asylum, along with UNHCR;

(c) As far as possible, refugees should be allowed to return to their place of former residence.

41. The protection responsibilities of UNHCR entail a monitoring role for a limited period, in close consultation with the parties concerned. For that purpose, UNHCR requires direct and unhindered access to returnees to monitor the fulfilment of the amnesties, guarantees or assurances on the basis of which the refugees have returned. That role has been acknowledged and supported by the Executive Committee in recent conclusions on international protection. 23/

42. More than the limited objective of repatriation itself, UNHCR programmes emphasize that the final objective is to ensure the durability of the voluntary repatriation. UNHCR also works to promote the integration of returnee aid programmes into national development plans, and the establishment of structures, including human rights mechanisms, that will ensure the durability of the voluntary repatriation beyond the initial reinsertion phase. This entails preparation for the return operation and its continued monitoring after it has been completed. The operation normally takes place only if protection criteria have been met and there are reasonable expectations for durable return. 24/

43. Standard operating procedures. Assistance to returnees within the context of a voluntary repatriation programme is intended to ensure return in dignity and the durability of the voluntary repatriation. It entails a range of measures that vary according to local circumstances and needs. Those measures fall into four categories: pre-departure arrangements, transportation, relief measures and rehabilitation. Assistance to returnees is provided by UNHCR

voluntary repatriation assistance projects. The cost of the actual repatriation movement, for example, transport, food/water for the journey, temporary shelter etc., and basic assistance to satisfy the immediate and individual needs of returnees, for example, blankets, tools, seeds etc., falls within the scope of General Programmes. 25/

44. The measures and procedures entailed by voluntary repatriation programmes are set forth in detail in several UNHCR documents, such as the UNHCR Manual and sets of instructions on specific issues. Guidelines are being finalized 26/ to codify the existing protection principles and the lessons learned from the Office's operational experience in a single document to guide voluntary repatriation. They will offer general guidance as to the issues and legal and practical considerations which should be taken into account when planning and implementing a voluntary repatriation programme. Used in conjunction with other pertinent documents, they aim to promote effectiveness and consistency in UNHCR practice. These guidelines will contain the following:

(a) A general overview and assessment of recent and contemporary experience and practice concerning voluntary repatriation;

(b) The general legal framework;

(c) The scope of certain terms used to describe the operational activities of UNHCR in this domain;

(d) How conditions conducive to voluntary repatriation may be promoted;

(e) The tripartite negotiation process;

(f) How the voluntary repatriation of refugees may be accomplished, including how any agreements reached may be effectively implemented.

A training module was completed and circulated to staff at the beginning of 1993. The training module covers several aspects of voluntary repatriation, with particular emphasis on operational issues concerning the planning and implementation of large-scale repatriation programmes. 27/

45. Operationality. For the effective application of the principles described above, a number of operational factors are decisive. UNHCR has particular strength in that:

(a) Management systems in place enable UNHCR staff to deal with the different components of repatriation programmes and unexpected developments; plans are drafted in the field and reviewed at Headquarters; UNDP has assisted UNHCR with regard to the planning of the reintegration of returnees;

(b) UNHCR has developed close working relations with implementing partners, namely the relevant non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations and government agencies;

(c) UNHCR staff are present at the field level and have the opportunity of acquiring first-hand and detailed knowledge of the situation;

(d) UNHCR headquarters has a 24-hour support structure enabling quick reaction for backup and reinforcement;

(e) There is an effort to draw lessons from past experience in implementing repatriation and rehabilitation programmes.

5. Human rights component

46. Experience. In UNTAG, the Namibian settlement proposal contained a formal mandate for an Independent Jurist (IJ). Concerning the release of prisoners and political detainees held by the South African authorities, it stated that any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees will be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the advice of a jurist of international standing, who will be designated by the Secretary-General to be legal adviser to the Special Representative. Advice was given not only on individual cases, but on whole categories of prisoners, as well as on questions of legal principle. It was felt that such a system was probably more adaptable than a formal adjudicative system would be. The human rights component of UNTAC assisted the Supreme National Council of Cambodia to adhere to several basic international human rights instruments, such as the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 28/ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 29/ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; 30/ Convention on the Rights of the Child. 31/ It undertook a review of the existing judicial and penal systems in the light of the provisions of those instruments. It also conducted an extensive human rights information and education campaign in close cooperation with the information/education and repatriation components of UNTAC, and conducted investigations of human rights-related complaints and assisted the authorities concerned in taking the necessary corrective measures.

47. A Human Rights Division was established in the first phase of operation of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) to verify the implementation of the Agreement on Human Rights. The active verification carried out by the Division is directed not only at an objective recording of facts, but also at the exercise of good offices aimed at assisting efforts of Salvadorians to find a remedy for violations. The Division also cooperates with Salvadorian institutions to strengthen their ability to work in promoting human rights and seeks to strengthen its relations with non-governmental human rights organizations.

48. Responsibility centre. The High Commissioner for Human Rights provides, through the Centre for Human Rights and other appropriate institutions, advisory services and technical and financial assistance, and coordinates the human rights promotion and protection activities throughout the United Nations system. 32/

49. The technical cooperation programme of the Centre for Human Rights currently provides assistance at the national level in the following areas: constitutional assistance; electoral assistance; legislative reform assistance; assistance in the development and strengthening of national human rights institutions; assistance to the judiciary, lawyers, police and prison officials

for human rights in the administration of justice; training in conflict resolution; training in reporting under human rights treaties; curriculum development and teacher education; support to non-governmental organizations and civil society; human rights and the mass media; information and documentation; and needs assessments.

50. Doctrine. The fundamental doctrine governing the role of the United Nations in the area of human rights is set forth in the Charter. Comprehensive elements of doctrine are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has the status of customary international law with applicability to all countries. The Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are treaties which a substantial number of States have ratified. The Centre uses the standards embodied in various United Nations declarations, bodies of principle and standard minimum rules, as well as jurisprudence developed by the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Taken together, those documents, which represent universal minimum standards, provide detailed guidance for the functioning of national infrastructures, particularly in the area of the administration of justice, including courts, police agencies and prisons. The World Conference on Human Rights, held at Vienna from 14 to 25 June 1993, recognizing the important role of human rights components in specific arrangements concerning some peace-keeping operations by the United Nations, recommended that the Secretary-General should take into account the reporting, experience and capabilities of the Centre for Human Rights and human rights mechanisms, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 33/ No doctrine directly concerning the human rights component of peace-keeping missions has been drafted or discussed.

51. Standard operating procedures. The Commission on Human Rights requests studies, usually undertaken by a rapporteur selected by the Commission, on the human rights situation in many countries.

52. There is no documentation unit in the Centre for Human Rights containing manuals, reports and assessments of the human rights components of peace-keeping missions. Reports on human rights components of recently completed missions have not been systematically analysed as a source of lessons of experience.

53. No general guidelines or manuals dealing with the human rights component of peace-keeping operations have been developed. However, the Centre's handbooks, such as the series on "Teaching and learning about human rights" or the "Compilation of international instruments", have some pertinence. The Centre is also developing manuals on human rights training for the promotion and protection of human rights, human rights in the administration of justice (for judges, lawyers and prosecutors), pre-trial detention and human rights teaching at the university level. The last-mentioned manual is being prepared with the cooperation of UNESCO. Manuals on elections, national institutions and police will be released early in 1994.

54. Operationality. There are no management systems in place to mobilize assistance for the human rights component of peace-keeping missions. The Centre for Human Rights maintains a roster of human rights experts from which personnel could be recruited for peace-keeping operations.

55. No standard training materials exist for the human rights component of peace-keeping missions. The Advisory Services Branch of the Centre for Human Rights, however, is adopting a new approach to teaching and training activities; courses are now designed for the particular audience addressed, so that human rights principles, rather than being presented abstractly from the point of view of international instruments, are integrated within subject headings relevant to the work and responsibilities of the target audiences.

56. The Centre for Human Rights maintains close contact with governmental authorities and international and national non-governmental organizations and has a broad range of contacts with them on questions of human rights. Those mechanisms have so far not been geared to the human rights components of peace-keeping operations.

Recommendation 12. Responsibility centre for the human rights component

The Centre on Human Rights should be designated the responsibility centre for the development of doctrine, standard operating procedures and operationality for the human rights component of peace-keeping operations. The Centre should formulate, in consultation with DPKO, the programme of work and resource requirements needed to implement, for the human rights component, the functions listed in annex II below. Proposals for such programme budget requirements should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

6. Civilian police component

57. Experience. The original plan for UNTAG 34/ was for 360 police monitors; this was increased to 500 before implementation and to 1,500 just before the elections. UNTAG had contingents of police from 25 States with ranks and qualifications varying among the different national contingents. The overwhelming majority complied with the minimum requirements stated by the Secretary-General in his pre-implementation consultations with potential countries. A small minority were unable to drive or had no command of English or Dutch, even though United Nations police monitors had to interact constantly with the local populace. The most important conclusion drawn from the UNTAG police experience in the draft end-of-mission assessment was that standardized arrangements were needed for police operational planning, and should include a compendium of practice, disciplinary codes, uniform codes, codes on rank equivalency, on the disposition of complaints, on coordination, and on other practical questions, including training in the norms of the country of mission.

58. In UNTAC, 35/ the civilian police component operated in Phnom Penh and at the provincial and district levels and conducted patrols in villages. It participated, in cooperation with the military component, in supervising the checkpoints and patrols of the existing police forces in sensitive areas. In UNTAC, as well as UNTAG, some countries contributed police persons who did not speak the appropriate languages, could not drive or had little or no police experience. The police from one country that had provided eight weeks of specialized training were, however, particularly effective.

59. In the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, there were also civilian police monitors unable to drive, unable to communicate in either English or French, and without experience of general police duties, or without basic "first aid" knowledge. In UNPROFOR, however, all civilian police are tested for their driving and language skills upon their arrival in the mission area and are repatriated at their Government's expense if, after remedial training, they do not meet United Nations standards.

60. Responsibility centre. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) established the post of Civilian Police Adviser at the P-5 level in May 1993. An additional Professional post was assigned to the civilian police functions in 1994. That Civilian Police Unit reports to the Assistant Secretary-General for Planning and Support. Its functions are to provide advice and instructions for the development of civilian police forces and matters concerning their employment, rotation, condition of service, training and administration.

61. The Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch (United Nations Office at Vienna) maintains databases and conducts advisory services of some relevance to the police component of peace-keeping missions. 36/ In UNDP there were, as of 31 January 1994, two country projects and one regional project concerning civilian police.

62. Doctrine. The Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch has identified 18 international instruments of relevance to doctrine on police functions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and more specific instruments such as the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 37/ the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, 38/ and the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. 39/ There is, however, no doctrine on how to apply the principles in those instruments to peace-keeping operations. More importantly, there is no doctrine differentiating functions that should normally be performed by civilian police from those to be performed by military personnel.

63. Standard operating procedures. The Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch has produced a handbook of international standards for the use of the civilian police component of United Nations peace-keeping operations. The Police Adviser in DPKO has drafted a handbook for United Nations police monitors, which incorporates the handbook on standards, and draws on assessments of the civilian police experience in recent missions and elements from DPKO Guidelines for Governments contributing personnel/troops to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

64. Operationality. Some offers of civilian police have been made as part of the Stand-by Forces Initiative. As of 1 March 1994, an understanding had been reached with one country for 350 police, intentions to commit given by 5 countries specifying a total of several hundred police, and intentions to commit given by 12 additional countries without specification of numbers. Apart from this very recent development, there are no arrangements in place for mobilization of civilian police; no rosters of police resources exist.

65. Efforts are being made to specify the parameters needed to define the size and make-up of police components for specific operations. Standard requirements for civilian police personnel to form part of United Nations peace-keeping missions have not yet been adequately defined. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has offered to assist the United Nations in defining specific criteria to improve the operationality of the civilian police component and bring about a clearer differentiation between police and military duties. Field experience indicates that there are functions in peace-keeping operations which might be performed more advantageously by civilian police than by military personnel.

Recommendation 13. Responsibility Centre for Civilian Police component

The functions of the Civilian Police Unit in DPKO should be expanded to include all of those listed in annex II below. The level and number of staff assigned to that Unit should be commensurate with the implementation of those responsibilities as a matter of urgency. Programme budget proposals for implementation of this recommendation should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session.

Recommendation 14. Development of doctrine concerning the civilian police component of peace-keeping missions

Doctrine on the civilian police component of peace-keeping missions should be developed by a process similar to that described in paragraphs 30 and 31 above for the electoral component. The views of Member States on approaches to the civilian police component should be sought and guidelines drafted on the basis of those views and assessments of experience in missions.

Recommendation 15. Police experts on survey missions

All preparatory missions should include at least one expert on civilian police matters.

Recommendation 16. Policy on civilian police monitors

DPKO should adopt a policy governing civilian police monitors. The policy should include standards for: (i) skills, including driving, languages, knowledge of "first aid", and other aspects of the suitability of individuals for United Nations assignments; (ii) minimum police experience; (iii) rotation period; (iv) inclusion of women in civilian police contingents.

Recommendation 17. Stand-by arrangements for civilian police

The DPKO Stand-by Forces Unit should devote considerable effort to the development of stand-by arrangements for civilian police. This should be considered a priority task.

Recommendation 18. Repatriation of unqualified civilian police monitors

Member States nominating police monitors who do not satisfy basic requirements specified by the United Nations should pay all costs associated with those eventually disqualified.

7. Military component

66. Experience. The mandate of UNTAC illustrates the broad range of the functions that can now be expected of the military component: 40/ verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; supervision of the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of forces of the Cambodian parties; weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, storing of the arms and equipment of the cantoned and demobilized military forces; and assisting with mine-clearance, including related training programmes and mine-awareness programmes; investigation of alleged non-compliance with any of the provisions relating to military arrangements and provision of assistance in relation to the release of prisoners of war and support for the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. In the effort of UNTAC to create and maintain a neutral political environment, it reported "scores of incidents of political or ethnic violence ... as well as acts of harassment and intimidation". 41/

67. A recent evaluation study by the United States General Accounting Office made the following points concerning the UNTAC military component: 42/

> "UNTAC's civilian and military units reported to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, but there was little military-civilian coordination early in the operation. As a result, duplication of some tasks occurred, and the military could not properly plan security measures for civilian activities. In the provinces, there was no clear coordinating authority for military and civilian activities.
>
> "Although the U.N. Force Commander has overall authority for military operations, his orders and directives are carried out by each country's national commander. ... For example, all UNTAC troop contingents had the same rules of engagement, but some were passive when threatened, while others more assertive.
>
> "Despite the difficulties in commanding a diverse multinational force, UNTAC's broad field authority enabled it to respond flexibly to changes in Cambodia. For instance, UNTAC reconfigured the original military plan after the Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the peace process and was effective in redrawing new security zones."

68. An evaluation study for the Canadian Senate 43/ found "wide divergences in the operating methods of different national military contingents within each force".

69. The following observations and suggestions were offered by the Stand-by Forces Planning Team on issues concerning the chain of command:

(a) A clear policy on command and control is required and should be published for all operations. The team noted that the chain of command and the attributions of the different key authorities are not clear to many of those serving in the missions. In addition, command relationships varied widely from one mission to another;

(b) The chain of command should go from the Secretary-General down to the smallest element, straight and unique. Each level of authority should have full responsibility of those under its command; parallel or technical links should not interfere nor replace hierarchical organization;

(c) Authority should be delegated for each level of subordination in accordance with its responsibilities. Financial authority and accountability should be commensurate with responsibility at each level;

(d) The key appointments in a mission are the head of mission and his deputy. To ensure proper operational control these two appointments should be assisted by a chief of staff with adequate staff officers;

(e) The other key appointments are force commander, chief administrative officer, and the heads of the different components. All must be under direct command of the mission head, who has to ensure proper control and coordination of their actions;

(f) In order to avoid a waste of time, money and energy, the actions of the different organizations deployed in a mission area should be coordinated at mission head level.

70. The Military Staff Committee consists of military representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Under Article 47 of the Charter of the United Nations, the function of the Council is to "advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements". The same Article provides that the Military Staff Committee "shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council".

71. Responsibility centre. The Planning Division within the Office of Planning and Support, DPKO, oversees the activities of five units: (a) Mission Planning Service; (b) Civilian Police Unit; (c) Demining Unit, responsible for addressing the land-mine problem in United Nations missions, both peace-keeping and humanitarian; (d) Training Unit; (e) Special Programmes Unit. The Military Adviser of DPKO advises the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General of DPKO, on the military implications of United Nations resolutions, plans and proposals for the conduct of field missions and advises Force Commanders and other military staff in field missions on the implementations of those plans and proposals. The Military Adviser also provides guidance and supervision to all military desk officers and other military staff throughout DPKO in the provision of support to peace-keeping and other operations, and acts as the head of the Planning Division. The functions assigned to the Planning Division make it an adequate responsibility centre for

the overall development of doctrine, standard operating procedures and operationality in its areas of competence.

72. At the field level, the military component of each peace-keeping operation is headed by a Force Commander.

73. DPKO maintains a situation room, the primary roles of which are round-the-clock communications with field missions, follow-up on events and to collate and provide relevant information to the head of DPKO, senior officials and others concerned.

74. Doctrine. There is no general doctrine governing conditions that must be met before a mission can be deployed, although some Member States are developing such doctrine to govern their participation in United Nations missions. 44/

75. Intergovernmental agreement on the prerequisites for United Nations action is considered by the Security Council on a case-by-case basis and set out in the mandate of each mission. Detailed guidelines are formulated for each mission.

76. In the post-Cold War era, new situations have developed under which the principles of earlier customary practice are being tested. In the new context, the previously clear boundaries between peace-keeping operations and enforcement action are becoming blurred.

77. Standard operating procedures. Draft Guideline Standard Operating Procedures for Peace-keeping Operations, which are comprehensive and cover both Headquarters and Operations, were issued in 1991 with a "restricted" circulation. For Operations, the issues reviewed include the use of force, liaison, checkpoints, roadblocks and searches, patrolling, breaches of agreement and security of troops.

78. In the foreword to the Guideline SOPs, it is stated that they "will be reviewed once a year and revised as necessary". Although this has not been done as yet, there are intentions to do so.

79. Operationality. In the fall of 1992, the Secretary-General requested several Member States to assist him in setting up a system which would allow the Secretariat to deploy new missions more rapidly. In early 1993, a Stand-by Forces Planning Team, consisting of seven senior military officers from Argentina, Canada, Denmark, France, Ghana, Pakistan and Poland, was assembled in New York and administratively attached to the Military Adviser's Office. In the first phase of its work, the Team made an in-depth study of former as well as current missions, visited four presently deployed missions, and designed the elements needed for future missions. On 16 April 1993, the project was presented to the Ambassadors of Member States in New York. In its second phase, the team visited 45 countries in order to explain the project and explore possible contributions. In addition, negotiations were conducted with 58 countries through their missions in New York. As of 1 March 1994, specific discussions are in process concerning 22 "Units" (battalion size, infantry, engineers, logistics) and 19 "Sub units" (company size, all specialities).

80. The General Assembly, in paragraph 53 of resolution 48/42, encouraged "troop contributors to consider arrangements between themselves for the loan

and/or exchange of peace-keeping operations experts to enhance operational effectiveness through sharing of information and experience gained in peace-keeping operations".

81. Efforts are under way for the preparation of United Nations norms to guide the training of national contingents to undertake peace-keeping operations. Efforts are also under way to provide more systematic training/briefing of military staff as part of the need to strengthen the preparatory phase. The issue of training is to be reviewed as part of the follow-up to the present report proposed in paragraph 84 below.

Recommendation 19. Development of doctrine concerning the military component of peace-keeping missions

Doctrine on the military component of peace-keeping missions should be developed by a process similar to that described in paragraphs 30 and 31 above. The views of Member States should be sought and guidelines drafted on the basis of these views and assessments of experience in missions.

Recommendation 20. Stand-by Forces system

Further development of operationality in the military component should be governed by the concept of negotiated pre-arrangements between the Secretary-General and Member States covering such matters as types of resources required; response times for individuals, and formed elements, sub-units and units; minimum employment periods; training; control of resources; financing and logistics. Such stand-by arrangements should be extended, as proposed in recommendation 17 above, to the civilian police component, and should eventually cover other civilian personnel as well, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 48/42, paragraph 4.

Recommendation 21. Guideline standard operating procedures

The "Guideline Standard Operating Procedures for Peace-keeping Operations" issued in 1991 should be revised and updated by the end of 1994, and reviewed annually thereafter.

Recommendation 22. Peace-keeping information network

DPKO should serve as the secretariat for the information and exchange network envisaged in General Assembly resolution 48/42, paragraph 53.

C. Pre-mission negotiation and preparation

82. Negotiations on international problems can take years to bear fruit. The final stages of protracted negotiations, however, can be surprisingly rapid. Often those negotiations are conducted outside the auspices of the United Nations, which becomes formally seized with the problem only after agreement has been reached. The period between the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council mandating a peace-keeping mission and the commencement of the deployment envisaged in the resolution is measured in weeks rather than years, since rapid action is needed to seize the opportunity offered by the mandate. Consequently,

it is important that as much preparatory activity as possible commence before the formal mandate of a mission is adopted.

83. The 10-year delay between the adoption of its mandate and the deployment of UNTAG in Namibia provided an unfortunate but instructive experiment in advance planning. The case of UNTAG shows: (a) that a great deal of useful advance planning can be conducted even years in advance of deployment; (b) the value of early selection of senior officials for a mission and the possibility and value of their involvement in a negotiation process conducted outside United Nations auspices. The case of ONUSAL shows the value of even a very small preparatory presence in the field prior to full agreement. The case of UNTAC shows the possibility and value of a sizeable rapid deployment in advance of the mission itself.

Recommendation 23. Preparations during the negotiation phase

DPKO should undertake a study of the political issues involved in preparatory activity prior to the adoption of a mandate for a peace-keeping mission. The study should draw conclusions concerning such issues as:

(a) Modalities of consultation between the United Nations and political negotiators, during negotiation processes conducted outside the auspices of the United Nations, concerning the capacities and limitations of the United Nations, whenever agreements envisaged in the negotiations are likely to call for United Nations field operations;

(b) The establishment, with the agreement of the parties concerned, of a minimal and strictly preparatory United Nations presence in the field prior to the completion of final agreements calling for a United Nations operation, and funding arrangements for such a presence;

(c) Procedures for informal soundings with Member States on practical aspects of their participation in a prospective mission.

Proposals based on conclusions drawn from this study should be submitted to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.

II. FURTHER IN-DEPTH EVALUATION OF PEACE-KEEPING

84. It is recommended that:

Recommendation 24. Specialized intergovernmental review

The present report, together with the conclusions and recommendations of CPC thereon, should be transmitted to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations for consideration and action.

Recommendation 25. Final in-depth evaluation of the start-up phase of peace-keeping operations

The status of a ready capacity to act should be examined, using the questions in annex I below as a guide, for the following:

(a) Substantive issues

(i) Overall direction and coordination, including the legal aspects of missions;

(ii) Humanitarian component;

(iii) Civil administration component.

(b) Administrative support functions

(i) Planning, including survey missions, and advance missions;

(ii) Financing, including resources in the Working Capital Fund;

(iii) Staffing, including the security and safety of personnel;

(iv) Logistics, including a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment;

(v) Procurement;

(vi) Training.

85. The General Assembly, in resolution 48/221, paragraph 2, requested "the Joint Inspection Unit to study carefully all problems arising during the start-up phase of peace-keeping operations". The Office of Inspection and Investigation will coordinate its work with JIU in order to avoid duplication of effort.

86. At the first part of its thirty-third session, CPC recommended to the General Assembly that the in-depth evaluation in 1997 be on either the Department of Humanitarian Affairs or the environment programme. 45/ Should CPC decide to evaluate the Department in 1997, a progress report on the evaluation would be due in 1995, which could then be reviewed together with the final report on the humanitarian component of peace-keeping.

87. The CPC may wish to consider requesting in-depth evaluations of aspects of peace-keeping other than the start-up phase.

Notes

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/48/16), part one, para. 35.

2/ The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.90.I.18).

3/ ST/SGB/152.

4/ ST/AI/326.

5/ ST/SGB/242.

6/ ST/AI/326, paras. 4 (b) and (c).

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1 (A/48/1), para. 297.

8/ ST/SGB/Organization, Section:DPI/Rev.1, 21 October 1993, sect. 4.1.1.

9/ A/48/407, paras. 11-18.

10/ To be issued under the symbol ST/SGB/ORG.

11/ A/48/590, para. 14.

12/ Ibid., para. 9.

13/ General Assembly resolution 46/137, para. 2.

14/ A/46/609 and Corr.1, para. 79.

15/ A/47/668, para. 53.

16/ Ibid., para. 63.

17/ A/48/590, paras. 56-74.

18/ See A/47/668, annex IV.

19/ A/42/521-S/19085, annex.

20/ See A/44/527 and Corr.1 and 2.

21/ Annex to General Assembly resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950.

22/ UNHCR Manual (revision of November 1991), chap. 4, sect. 1.2, para. 5.

23/ Ibid., sect. 2.5, paras. 4-5.

24/ See, for example, Refugees, No. 90, July 1992, p. 38; High Commissioner's Opening Statement to the Executive Committee on 5 October 1992, p. 1.

25/ Manual, sect. 2.5.

26/ Information note on the development of the guidelines of UNHCR on the protection aspects of voluntary repatriation, paras. 3, 17, 10-15.

27/ Ibid., para. 6.

28/ General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI).

29/ General Assembly resolution 39/46.

30/ General Assembly resolution 2106 A (XX).

31/ General Assembly resolution 44 (25).

32/ General Assembly resolution 48/141, paras. 4 (d) and (i).

33/ World Conference on Human Rights, The Vienna Declaration and Plan of Action (A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III).

34/ Security Council resolution 435 (1978); and S/20472, S/20658 and S/20872.

35/ United Nations Peace-keeping Information Notes, 1993: Update No. 1, p. 51 (DPI/1306/Rev.1, March 1993).

36/ Medium-term Plan for the period 1992-1997 (Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 6 (A/45/6/Rev.1)), vol. II, para. 29.9.

37/ Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments (United Nations publication, Sales No. 93.XIV.1), p. 243.

38/ General Assembly resolution 43/173.

39/ General Assembly resolution 34/169.

40/ United Nations Peace-keeping Information Notes, 1993: Update No. 1, op. cit., p. 49.

41/ S/25289 of 13 February 1993, para. 13.

42/ United States General Accounting Office, U.N. Peacekeeping - Lessons Learned in Managing Recent Missions (Washington, D.C., December 1993), pp. 5 and 6.

43/ Senate of Canada, Meeting New Challenges: Canada's Response to a New Generation of Peace-keeping, Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs (February 1993), p. 56.

44/ See, for example, the address to the General Assembly on 27 September 1993 by Mr. William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America (A/48/PV.4, p. 11); Gareth Evans, Cooperating For Peace (Australia), Allen and Unwin, 1993, pp. 109-114; Senate of Canada, op. cit., p. 3.

45/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/48/16), part one, para. 35.

Annex I

QUESTIONS UTILIZED TO DETERMINE THE STATUS OF A READY CAPACITY TO ACT

1. Responsibility centre

1.1 Does a unit exist that has been assigned responsibility for development of the component?

1.2 Does the unit have assigned to it in the Secretary-General's Bulletin (ST/SGB/ORG) all the functions needed to be a centre of institutional memory and of the development of the doctrine, standard operating procedures and operationality needed to have a ready capacity to act?

1.3 Are the regular budget resources allocated to the unit adequate for those tasks? Have trust funds for extrabudgetary resources been established?

1.4 What related activities and capacities exist in other parts of the United Nations system?

2. Doctrine

2.1 Are there treaties, covenants or agreements that provide broad principles to govern United Nations action under this component?

2.2 Is there intergovernmental agreement on the prerequisites for United Nations action - the conditions that should be satisfied before a mission can be approved?

3. Standard operating procedures

3.1 Does a documentation centre exist containing manuals, reports and assessments from previous missions?

3.2 Do agreed model guidelines exist governing provision of (or requests for) assistance by States?

3.3 Do handbooks or manuals or other written standard operating procedures exist? Do they reflect the full range of experiences and innovations of all recent missions?

4. Operationality

4.1 Are relations maintained with governmental departments and agencies, and with non-governmental organizations including United Nations Volunteers, active in work related to this component? Is there a forum for exchange of information and experience among these interested parties? Are there management systems in place to permit quick mobilization of assistance from them?

4.2 Do rosters of qualified United Nations or external personnel exist for this component? Are they regularly brought up to date? Does a screening process exist? Is there some minimal training or experience required to be placed on the roster?

4.3 Do standard training materials exist for this component?

4.4 Do delivery systems exist capable of responding promptly to requests for fielding a new mission?

Annex II

FUNCTIONS REQUIRED IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN CONCERNING A RESPONSIBILITY CENTRE IF IT IS TO DEVELOP A READY CAPACITY TO ACT a/

- Advises and assists the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping in the development of the [ ] component of peace-keeping missions;

- Establishes, develops and maintains institutional memory on the component and, to that end:

(a) Develops and maintains information on previous and current peace-keeping missions, including training materials, manuals, handbooks and other instructions;

(b) Gathers information on related activities undertaken by intergovernmental, regional or non-governmental organizations, as well as other entities of the United Nations system;

- Coordinates the development of the component, and acts as focal point for that development with other entities of the United Nations system and, to that end:

(a) Develops doctrine based on assessments of experience gained on previous and current peace-keeping missions and the views of Member States;

(b) Supervises the preparation of guidelines and operational manuals on the organization and conduct of the component;

(c) Maintains contacts with Governments and regional, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, including the United Nations Volunteers, active or potentially active in one or more components of peace-keeping missions; organizes international conferences, workshops, seminars and training courses on subjects related to the component in cooperation with outside entities; helps establish and maintain information networks on the component;

(d) Supervises the development and maintains rosters of core and non-core personnel qualified for the component;

(e) Supervises the development of agreed-upon common standards, skills, practices and procedures; and the development and conduct of training courses, or other means of certification, for all persons to be entered on rosters of qualified personnel;

- Provides substantive advice on the component during negotiations, based on experience with previous peace-keeping missions;

- Advises on the selection of senior staff for the [ ] component of missions;

- Undertakes initial needs assessment or fact-finding missions related to the preparation of operational plans, concepts of operations for the component;

- Prepares guidelines on the formulation of requests by Member States for assistance related to the component;

- Administers trust funds for the development of the component.

Notes

a/ To be issued under the symbol ST/SGB/ORG.